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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20051070-SC
Ct. Appls. No. 20040421-CA

BERNADETTE DURAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
Defendant does not dispute that the consumption of marijuana, and its consequent
destruction, creates an exigency. See Br. Appellee. Rather, she claims that the odor of
burning marijuana does not support a reasonable suspicion that marijuana is being
consumed or destroyed. She claims that it is impossible to distinguish the odor of
burning marijuana from that of burnt marijuana. Id. at 7-8. For that reason, she argues,
the smell of buming/bumt marijuana does not establish with certainty that marijuana is
being consumed and destroyed. Id. at 8-10.
I.
DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED CLAIM THAT THE OFFICERS
DID NOT AND COULD NOT DECTECT THE ODOR OF BURNING
MARIJUANA IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
Whether the officers smelled burning marijuana is an issue of fact. Defendant did
not challenge the officers' ability to detect burning marijuana on cross-examination

during the hearing on the motion to suppress or in her written argument following the
hearing. See R12, 60. She did not claim that marijuana was not being smoked. R60:5868; 20. Rather, in arguing to the trial court that exigent circumstances did not justify the
entry, defendant claimed that "the fact that marijuana is being smoked [cannot] by itself
be considered [an] exigent circumstance." R20. Defendant did not in any way dispute
the officers' testimony regarding their belief that marijuana was being consumed and
destroyed and that they could smell it. See R12. Thus, she did not preserve any claim
that the officers did not and could not smell burning marijuana.
On appeal, defendant made a one-sentence claim in her reply brief, arguing that it
had not been established whether the odor the officers smelled "was from stale or fresh
smoke." Reply Br. of Aplt. at 2. She provided no support or analysis for the claim. She
did not argue any justification for raising the claim for the first time on appeal. See State
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to consider waived claim
where appellant did not argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" to justify its
review). She did not explain why she should be permitted to challenge on appeal the
officers' testimony that the trailer occupants were "smokin' up the evidence" when she
did not cross-examine them about that testimony or present any contrary testimony
during the motion to suppress. R60:21. The court of appeals did not address her
unpreserved claim.
The court of appeals' opinion, upon which this Court granted certiorari, holds that
"[although the smell of burning marijuana provided the officers probable cause that a
crime was being committed, it did not create exigent circumstances that would permit a
2

warrantless entry." State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409,1f 22, 131 P.3d 246. The court did
not distinguish between burning and recently burnt marijuana. See id. Defendant did not
file a cross-petition challenging the court of appeals' implicit conclusion that the officers
had, in fact, detected "the smell of burning marijuana." Id. Thus, the issue before this
Court is not whether the officers could detect the odor of burning marijuana, a factual
inquiry. See Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, \ 7 n.3, 116 P.3d 290 (holding that claims
were "not properly before this court because they were neither included in [the] petition
for certiorari nor decided by the court of appeals"). The issue is rather "whether the
detectable odor of burning marijuana indicates an exigent circumstance permitting a
warrantless search of a residence." Order, dated February 8, 2006 (granting petition for
writ of certiorari).
H.
IN ANY CASE, REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT MARIJUANA IS
BEING OR IS ABOUT TO BE BURNED AND DESTROYED
SUFFICES
TO
ESTABLISH
AN
EXIGENCY;
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT A
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Even should this Court consider the merits of defendant's unpreserved claim,
defendant cannot prevail. Defendant cites no support for her claim that officers can never
absolutely determine on the basis of odor alone whether marijuana is presently burning or
already burnt, and the State does not concede that the distinction cannot be made. See Br.
Appellee at 11. But even assuming that officers cannot always accurately ascertain from
odor alone whether marijuana is still or was recently burning, the odor of burnt/burning
marijuana is nonetheless sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that the drug is in
3

the process of destruction and may be further destroyed before a warrant can be obtained.
Moreover, the officers here had not only the odor of burnt/burning marijuana, but
additional circumstances establishing reasonable suspicion.
A.

Reasonable suspicion does not require absolute certainty.
Officers need not be absolutely certain that an exigency exists before they may

make a warrantless entry. Rather, "if circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of
exigency," officers may enter. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37 (2003); see also
State v. Peterson, 2005 UT 17, f 10, 110 P.3d 699 (stating, in context of Terry stop, that
"reasonable suspicion" does not require than an officer "be absolutely certain"). Officers
need not be certain that the evidence is being or is about to be destroyed. Rather, they
must have reasonable suspicion of that matter. In addition, the "mere fact that there
might be an innocent explanation" for circumstances or conduct does not "vitiate[]
reasonable suspicion." Provo City Corp, v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993)
(addressing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Where circumstances are
"conceivably consistent" with non-exigent circumstances, but also "strongly indicative"
of exigent circumstances, reasonable suspicion of an exigency exists. Id.
B.

Here, the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion that an exigency
existed.
Here, the odor of either burning or recently burned marijuana supported a

reasonable belief that marijuana was in the process of destruction. That odor supports a
reasonable suspicion that marijuana is being consumed. Even if the odor of freshly burnt
marijuana may be "conceivably consistent" with circumstances in which the smokers

4

have recently doused the burning marijuana in their pipes or roach clips, the odor is still
"strongly indicative" of ongoing usage and supports a reasonable suspicion that the
marijuana is being burned and consumed.
Moreover, given that marijuana use is frequently a group activity, involving a
number of people taking varying numbers of "hits" over varying periods of time, officers
may reasonably suspect, based on the smell of recently-smoked marijuana, that usage,
even if sporadic and even if briefly delayed, is ongoing, and that further destruction of
evidence, if not actually in progress, is imminent.
Thus the smell of recently burned marijuana, like the smell of burning marijuana,
supports reasonable suspicion that marijuana is in the process of being consumed and
destroyed. While the smell may also be consistent with the recent use of marijuana, it is
"strongly indicative" of ongoing use and therefore of ongoing destruction.
In addition, nothing in this case suggests that the officers merely smelled the odor
of stale marijuana smoke. The officers received a report of ongoing marijuana use at
approximately 4:00 p.m. R60:16-17. They responded, arriving on site at approximately
4:40 p.m. R60:18. One citizen informant told them that he had been out to the trailer and
personally observed the occupants smoking marijuana. Id. As they talked with the
informants, the informants again told them "that there were people in the trailer that were
doing drugs." R60:42. As they approached the trailer, the officers smelled the odor of
burnt marijuana "leakin' out of the cracks of the trailer." R60:19. The odor was
unmistakable. Id.

5

Under these circumstances, the officers had reason to believe that the trailer
occupants had been and were smoking marijuana. When the officers arrived on site,
citizen informants told them that people were "doing drugs." R60:42. Citizen informants
are presumptively reliable. See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^ 14, 40 P.3d 1136
(stating that court presumes the veracity and reliability of information from ordinary
unpaid citizen informants); City of St George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah App.
1997) (stating that "[a] tip from a citizen informant who gives his or her name is highly
reliable because the police may verify the information and it subjects the informant to
penalty if the information is false"); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34
(1983). Moreover, the officers themselves smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. R60:19.
That odor did not just "hang in the air" or cling to clothing. It was "leaking," i.e., it was
flowing out of the trailer. See id. It was still in movement, i.e., spreading outward from
the point of origin. The officer's testimony that the odor was leaking out of the trailer
indicated that the odor was either actually being created by present burning or that it had
been freshly created and still had not stabilized.
Based on these matters, the officers had reasonable suspicion of an exigency—the
likelihood that evidence was in the process of destruction.

1

Defendant asserts that State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994), rev 'd on
other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996), controls the disposition of this case "because
the State has not requested that this precedent be overturned." Br. Appellee at 17. This
Court is not bound by any decision of the court of appeals. Moreover, defendant cites no
authority for her implicit claim this Court is without power to overrule a case unless the
petitioner formally requests that it do so.
6

CONCLUSION
Respectfully submitted this Op day of

_, 2006.
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